The conviction of ISWAP commander as a lesson for others

By : Anthony

Date: 12 December 2025 5:29am WAT

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Hussaini Ismaila

Hussaini Ismaila

The message in the recent court conviction and imprisonment of a commander of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is clear that those who inflict terror on society will not go scot-free without being subjected to justice. Hussaini Ismaila was sentenced to 20 years in jail following the guilty verdict delivered by Justice Emeka Nwite of the Federal High Court in Abuja.

The development was a noteworthy victory that demonstrates that Nigeria’s legal system, despite its challenges, can effectively deliver justice in the prosecution of terrorists. However, the fact that the trial has dragged on for nearly eight years means that the convict has already served a significant portion of his jail term, exposing systemic weaknesses that must be corrected if the country hopes to bolster its counter-terrorism initiatives. Nonetheless, the conviction remains a morale booster for the nation, the Department of State Services (DSS) and other security agencies.

Ismaila was convicted for coordinating the infamous January 20, 2012, attacks in Kano State. It was described as one of the deadliest single-day events in the Boko Haram insurgency at the time. Ismaila’s terrorist exploits included assaults on the Police Headquarters in Bompai, the Mobile Police Base along Kabuga Road, the Pharm Centre Police Station, and the Angwa Uku Police Station. Following the onslaught, the death toll went to at least 185 people, including 32 police officers. About 57 other persons sustained injuries.

This court victory can hardly be considered substantial, given the circumstances surrounding it. Ismaila is only one of hundreds of terrorists killing and abducting innocent Nigerians over the past 16 years or so. Most of the others are still roaming free and committing more atrocities. Secondly, while Ismaila committed the offence in 2012, he was arrested five years later in 2017, and his trial was concluded eight years later in 2025. That singular case took 13 years between the commission of the crime and the delivery of justice. Obviously, that is not satisfactory, particularly in view of the hundreds of terrorists, their commanders, and their sponsors still enjoying freedom to commit more heinous crimes.

Terrorism has assumed such a heartbreaking dimension in the country as to require more drastic measures, not only to fight and bring the culprits to their knees, but also to fast-track the wheels of justice for those apprehended. This could very well be an appropriate matter for special courts or tribunals, devoid of the legal trappings and cumbersome procedures of normal courts, as available in countries such as the United States. If lawmakers need to make necessary amendments to the terrorism law, this is the time for it, and the Ismaila case is more than an impetus. The country still has a lot to do to successfully combat terrorism rather than to spend 12 years hovering over one criminal who would soon regain total freedom in a few years’ time.

Admittedly, still, the judgment is a welcome precedent that warns other would-be terrorists: the Nigerian state, however slowly the wheels grind, will pursue justice. Additionally, the conviction demonstrates a serious commitment to combating terrorism and lends credibility when negotiating globally for cooperation in intelligence sharing and capacity building.    Beyond these, uncomfortable questions arise about the convict’s sentence and its deterrent impact. While 20 years behind bars seems substantial, the concurrent clause means that Ismaila will serve only 20 years altogether, not the 75 years that would result had the sentences run consecutively: that is, 15 years for count one plus 20 years each for counts two, three, and four. Even more disturbing is that the sentence will commence from the date of Ismaila’s arrest, August 31, 2017. This means that the ISWAP commander has already served more than seven years of his term even before the judgment was delivered.    While this arrangement is legally permissible and within constitutional boundaries, it dramatically reduces the punishment. In a context where a terrorist leader has coordinated mass killings and sown fear in an entire state, it calls into question the proportionality of the sentence to the crime. What sort of deterrent leaves extremists believing that even if caught and convicted, they could realistically have a fraction of their sentence shaved off?

Concurrent sentencing—common in Nigerian jurisprudence and designed to avoid excessive punishment—may be ill-suited to terrorism cases involving multiple, coordinated attacks. When a terrorist deliberately plans and executes separate assaults on different targets, each attack represents a distinct criminal act. Reasonably, each should be apportioned a separate punishment. The victims of the Bompai attack are different from those of the Kabuga Road assault. Unfortunately, concurrent sentencing treats these crimes as one single event. The authorities, including law enforcement officers and enforcers, particularly the Attorney General of the Federation and the Minister of Justice, should address this issue urgently, ensuring that sentences truly reflect the gravity of terrorism offences.

The order that Ismaila undergo rehabilitation and deradicalisation after completing his prison term, but before reintegration into society, presents a substantial operational hurdle that Nigeria might be ill-prepared to scale. Correctional facilities are plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, and inadequate security, and are often breeding spaces for extremist networks. The difficulty that attends deradicalising a senior ISWAP operative, 20 years after incarceration, should, therefore, never be underestimated. Anticipating any meaningful deradicalisation might be naïve and dangerous.

The timing also raises concerns. Is deradicalisation most effective after a sentence has been served or during confinement? Under international best practices, rehabilitation and deradicalisation are best carried out during incarceration, alongside psychological assessments, religious counselling, educational opportunities, and family engagement.

Justice Nwite’s ruling assumes that Nigeria operates an effective and adequately funded deradicalisation programme, complete with defined procedures, skilled staff, measurable outcomes, and proper oversight. This assumption, amid the controversies dogging the current Operation Safe Corridor initiative, appears overly optimistic.

The 13 years that elapsed between the crimes and the conviction is a timeline that denotes a fundamental failure of the justice system: one that frustrates victims and allows evidence to deteriorate.

Trials must be accelerated through dedicated terrorism courts with specially trained judges, prosecutors, and defence counsel. These courts would be expected to streamline procedures while respecting due process and eliminating delays. Also, witness protection programmes must be strengthened and well-funded. The country must boost investment in counter-terrorism intelligence and evidence-gathering, and improve inter-agency coordination among the DSS, police, military, immigration, customs, correctional centres and others. It must equally ensure that convicted terrorists do not simply mark time in prison before emerging into freedom unchanged or further radicalised.

Amidst the current wave of terrorism, the question is not whether Nigeria can secure occasional convictions of terrorists; clearly, it can. The question is whether the government can build a justice system that is swift, strong, and smart enough to serve as a genuine pillar of its counter-terrorism strategy. Ismaila’s case suggests there is more work to do. The challenge now is to transform this isolated success into systemic competence before the next generation of terrorists calculates that prosecution is more about legal barks than punitive bites.

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