International Politics of Benin’s 2025 Coup and Nigeria’s Intervention: Quo Vadis, Africa?

Bola A. Akinterinwa

The foiled coup d’état on Sunday, 7th December, 2025 in the Republic of Benin raises many questions than answers. First, will there ever be an end to coup-making in Africa, and particularly in the West and Central Africa regions of Africa? This question is raised in light of the fact that most of the coups d’état that had taken place occurred in the two regions where the policies of subsidiarity and zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) are underscored. African Union (AU)’s principle of subsidiarity is about bringing the peace process nearer to the people. In other words, it is predicated on the belief that sustainable peace is possible if conflict resolution mechanisms are enabled by people who are geopolitically and strategically close to the scene of a given crisis. In other words, crises in the West Africa region are expected to be handled by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The same is expected of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) for the crises in the Central Africa region.

Secondly, why is it that all the states involved in the coups in the past five years are Francophone states? In the immediate post-independence era, coup-making was common with Lusophone and Anglophone countries of Africa. Today, the Anglophones appear to have thrown UCG into the garbage of history or left it for the Francophones to manage. Are the coups mainly anti-French? Will the rapprochement with Russia be more profitable than that of the traditional allies?

Thirdly, with the recidivist character of coup-making in West Africa, what really is the future of the AU-ECOWAS policy of zero tolerance for UCG in Africa? On the one hand, the sermons of continental unity are preached. On the other hand, Africa is playing host to establishment of sub-regions and sub-regional organisations. Can the objective of continental unity be achieved by dividing? Can one unite by dividing or what is uniting by dividing? More importantly, has democracy any good future if elected presidents are now the very people organising coups d’état in their home countries, especially as most recently shown in the case of Guinea-Bissau? In which way is the Bissau-Guinean coup different from that in Benin?

Benin’s 2025 Coup and Nigeria’s Intervention

The various coups d’état in West Africa since 2021 appear to have enjoyed popular support which has also made a nonsense of the sanctions taken by the ECOWAS against the military juntas that came to power by use of force. The African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS have shown keen interest in fighting UCG but with little or no interest in the dynamics of the coup-making. They appear to want to defend elected presidents to the detriment of the interests of the people. This is one conflict of interest that enhanced coup-making.

Put differently, whose interests take priority: those of the people or those of the elected government? Why is the AU or ECOWAS not able to promote and ensure good governance, and by so doing prevent coup-making? Why are the regional organisations not interested in containing poor governance, which is one important reason for coup-making? Why is there much interest in sanctioning UCG? Why is making a society free from political chicanery and policy remissness impossible in Africa?

Most disturbingly, Benin Republic is on record to have had several coups since the time of her independence: the 1963 Dahomeyan coup d’état, 1972 Dahomeyan coup d’état, 1977 Beninese coup attempt, 2025 Beninese foiled coup, etc. If there had been coups after coup, it is because there had been many things wrong with political governance at the level of leadership. For instance, why are lessons not learnt from the first coup? Why are the reasons given for a coup not addressed by successor regimes or administrations? The political situation in Benin Republic that led to the coup of December 7, 2025 ought to have been addressed by either the ECOWAS or the AU. This was never the case before the coup.

President Patrice Guillaume Athanase Talon, who has been serving as the eighth President of Benin Republic since 2016, is not on record to have promoted good governance, even though he is a good and strong member of the Celestial Church of Christ. He has tried to mediate the crisis and dispute between the Registered Board of Trustees of the Church and the Pastor and Head of the Church, Reverend Mobiyina Oshoffa, but to no avail.

In 2016, President Talon not only promised in April 2016 to be in power only for one term, but also to change the presidential term to only one term of five years. Today, he is being accused of pursuing a third-term agenda. This is in spite of his publicly declared non-intention to contest again. He is also accused of turning Benin into a one-party state and oppressing the opposition elements. He has been accused of embezzling 18m euros in taxes in 2012 when he was not yet elected president.

And true enough, the more critical dynamic of the coup appears to be the decision of President Talon to capture the parliament and to use the judiciary as a tool of public oppression. For instance, he reportedly appointed his personal lawyer and friend, Joseph Djogbéndu, as Minister of Justice when he came to power in 2016. In 2018, Djogbéndu was further elevated to the position of the President of the Constitutional Court, which is the highest judicial authority of the land. Djogbéndu eventually turned the Constitutional Court from being an independent watchdog into partisanship and instrument of presidential oppression.

Most disturbingly, President Talon has consciously made political life difficult for opposition parties to survive and to participate in electoral politics. For instance, there are more than 200 registered parties in Benin which President Talon considered as unwieldy and not helpful to effective governance. True, many of the parties are small. On October 18, 2025, the National Assembly passed a bill requiring the possession of a Certificate of Conformity to be eligible to participate in electoral politics. In fact, only two parties loyal to President Talon were found to be eligible to contest elections. This is because the new law also requires the payment of $424,000 to qualify to field a list of candidates for the 83-seat parliament. Besides, 10% of the votes of the 109 mayors and deputies was required to be able to contest. This largely explains the many protests against his administration and attempted coups. It is against this background that the last December 7 coup should be understood.

As regards Nigeria’s intervention to assist President Talon, the intervention can be justified for various reasons. First is the reason of sanctity of international agreements. In this regard, there is the first consideration of subsidiarity principle by which a central government is considered to only have responsibility for tasks that cannot be effectively performed by a central government at a more immediate or local level. In other words, as explained above, regional organisations like the ECOWAS has responsibility to nip in the bud crises and ensure peace in its region within the framework of its 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression which discourages the use of force to settle disputes and its 22 April 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defences on non-aggression and mutual assistance. Both Protocols request Nigeria to assist or provide, if necessary, troops to help contain situations of insecurity, threats, aggression in the region by way of mutual assistance. In this regard, why wouldn’t Nigeria accept to do so in the spirit of pacta sunt servanda?

As noted in a Joint ECCAS-CMI Publication on “The Principle of Subsidiarity: The Example of ECCAS in the Central Africa Crisis,” subsidiarity has several advantages the most prominent of which are the enablement of better local awareness, especially that the role of actors cannot but be more fitting to the task to be performed when better analysis and understanding of issues underlying a situation exists. There will be more interest in the outcome due to proximity. This is because ‘local actors have more to potentially gain or lose in the outcome. Local actors are more interested in seeing sustainable and effective outcomes than a more distant actor might be.’ This point is particularly relevant as President Talon apparently has considered this factor of proximity in requesting for help from Nigeria.

Subsidiarity cannot but also have greater flexibility and adaptability in responding quickly to situational changes on the ground. And perhaps more interestingly, subsidiarity enables greater legitimacy as actors that are closer are seen as more legitimate than distant actors. Thus, Nigeria’s intervention in helping to contain the coup in Benin Republic is justified on the basis of this principle of subsidiarity.

It cannot but also be an act of unfriendliness if Nigeria is asked to assist and such request is neglected. All those seeking safety and are being pursued in Nigeria have generally escaped Nigeria through Dahomey, the Benin Republic of today. In the event of any problem in Nigeria in the future, Benin may no longer be an escape route for safety as the country may apply the principle of reciprocity. Besides, Nigeria has a defence doctrine that considers Nigeria’s international border to be in faraway Mali and Mauritania. Any outbreak of any gunfire in Mali is considered happening on Nigeria’s border with Benin, and therefore should be quenched in Mali before its exportation to Nigeria. The coup in Benin has become too close for comfort, hence the need to quickly and promptly respond to Benin’s request for assistance.

And true enough again, Nigeria’s intervention in Benin provides a good opportunity for self-capacity building in the context of the country’s quest for strategic autonomy as a new foreign policy objective. Nigeria’s intervention was a resultant from sovereign autonomy which must also be well protected and defended in the mania of the 1963 Nigeria’s formulation of an exception to the principle of non-intervention under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.

International Politics and Future of Africa

International politics of coup-making in Africa does not go beyond condemnation of and taking sanctions against the putschists, asking for the immediate release of the ousted president and other detained officials, as well as restoration of the democratic status quo ante. ECOWAS condemnations and sanctions follow the same pattern and logic from one coup to the other.

In the Bissau-Guinean coup, the Communiqué of the Extraordinary Session of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council is quite relevant here. The Extraordinary session was held virtually at the Level of Heads of State and Government. Attention was focused on the Situation in the Republic of Guinea Bissau. The resulting communiqué, which was issued on 27 November 2025, noted, in its paragraph 6, that the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) ‘Condemn in the strongest terms the coup d’état perpetrated on 26 November 2025 and calls for the unconditional restoration of constitutional order without delay. It rejects any arrangements that perpetuate the illegal abortion of the democratic process and the subversion of the will of the people of Guinea Bissau.’ It is important to note that the word ‘Condemn’ begins with a capital letter ‘C’ which is meant to underscore the importance of the condemnation.

While paragraph 7 demands that ‘the leaders of the coup respect the will of the people and allow the National Electoral Commission to proceed without delay with the declaration of the results of the elections of 23 November 2025,’ paragraph 8 ‘calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all detained officials.’ The MSC, in paragraph 10, ‘calls on the leaders of the coup to guarantee the safety and facilitate the evacuation and safe passage of ECOWAS and all other international election observers. And perhaps more interestingly, the MSC, in paragraph 13 ‘urges the armed forces of Guinea Bissau to return to barracks and to maintain their constitutional role.’ Again, the use of the word ‘urges,’ is noteworthy. The ECOWAS finds it easy to condemn but difficult to enforce. It can only urge. This observation is not different from the provisions of the Communiqué issued by the Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP).

Under paragraph 3 of the Communiqué, the CPLP ‘strongly condemns the interruption of the ongoing electoral process, considering it a serious violation of democratic principles and the sovereign will of the people of Guinea Bissau.’ It also ‘demands the immediate and unconditional release of all individuals detained in the context of the current political crisis and ‘recommends the temporary suspension of Guinea-Bissau,’ unlike the immediate suspension by the ECOWAS until the return to democratic order. In fact, the CPLP expressed ‘solidarity with the people of Guinea Bissau’ under paragraph 4.

In the case of the Beninese coup, the ECOWAS Commission noted in Abuja, on 07th December, 2025 that it ‘has received with consternation reports of an attempted military take-over in the Republic of Benin, and that it ‘strongly condemns this unconstitutional move that represents a subversion of the will of the people of Benin.’ The Commission not only ‘calls for the full respect of the Constitution of Benin,’ but also ‘holds the leaders of the plot both individually and collectively responsible for any loss to life and property occasioned by their action.’

Is this threat a solution? In the eyes of The Cable, ‘let us be honest: West Africa is sitting on a democratic fault-line. Elections are increasingly contentious. Institutions are underperforming. Citizens feel abandoned. Leaders behave with impunity. In such an environment, coups stop being unthinkable. They become tempting. And foreign actors – whether Moscow or any other power – are more than happy to exploit that vacuum. The danger is not just the coups themselves, but also the erosion of democratic norm.’ (vide Oumarou Sanon, “Benin: Failed Coup, Russia’s shadow and West Africa’s democratic unravelling,” The Cable, December 9, 2025).

According to the Africa Report, entitled “Benin coup attempt: what we know about France’s role’ Presidents Emmanuel Macron and Patrice Talon spoke by phone while the coup attempt was still under way on Sunday 7 December. The French president then lobbied Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu to intervene.’ What is politically interesting here is to know who called President Tinubu of Nigeria first: Emmanuel Macron of France or the Beninese president? If as shown above, the French president had a telephonic conversation with President Talon while the coup was still in the making and it was made clear that Emmanuel Macron informed Talon that he had consulted with Nigeria on the need to intervene, this means that the request for assistance from Nigeria might be after the telephone conversation. Still, the request might have taken place before the telephone conversation in which case President Talon only kept mute. The problem in this case is why it has to be France that will have to define the way forward. The problem is also why the Beninese called France first and not the ECOWAS or Nigeria first.

UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, condemned the coup and noted that it would ‘further threaten the stability of the region.’ The African Union Commission Chairperson also ‘strongly and unequivocally condemns the military coup attempt.’ Many are the reports that tried to link Russia’s involvement in the coup, the Russian authorities appeared to have preferred keeping mute. China has not been outspoken on the matter. Generally speaking, the EU, the US and other big powers have only condemned the coup, but Nigeria has intervened and has secured parliamentary approval for the intervention after the intervention.

With this type of coup-making development in Africa, what future has Africa? What future is there for democracy to thrive? In trying to answer these questions, it is useful to learn lessons from the coups. First, the mere fact that democracy has thrived for a reasonably length of time does not mean that there cannot be a new coup. Eternal vigilance cannot but be a top policy priority. In fact, the longer democracy exists and make life too convenient for people, the likelier the elected leaders begin to turn dictatorial and the more the people have the potential to support military take-over of power. Consequently, there is the need to strengthen all democratic institutions. Secondly, timely intervention and mediation have become a desideratum. More interestingly, the need for promotion of dialogue between governments and civil society has to be promoted. The appropriate thing here is for all member states of the AU and the ECOWAS to create different platforms for citizen engagement where grievances can be discussed and resolved. In this regard, emphasis should be placed on how to addressing the root causes of discontent. In the same vein, there has to be a collaborative regional solutions approach. The current style of some leaders talking about zero tolerance for UCG and some other African leaders are engaging in self-staged coups can never brighten the future of democracy in Africa. It is the future of coup-making that will be brightened. Africa now needs a democratic re-strategy.