WHAT A U.S.- NIGERIA SECURITY PACT COULD MEAN FOR SOVEREIGNTY

ABIODUN OLUWADARE argues that while external security cooperation may offer short-term advantages, its long-term implications for sovereignty and democratic accountability are far from neutral

In recent weeks, public discourse in Nigeria has been animated by reports and speculation surrounding alleged United States military actions in the country’s northwest, reportedly based on an understanding between Washington and Abuja. Beyond the initial excitement or alarm, such claims have generated, the more important question is not whether foreign firepower was deployed, but what the geopolitical and economic implications of deepened U.S.–Nigeria security cooperation would mean for Nigeria’s long-term sovereignty, regional standing, and internal security architecture.

History suggests that no major power, least of all the United States, engages in security partnerships without strategic calculation. International relations are not governed by charity, sentiment, or goodwill alone; they are shaped by interests, leverage, and long-term advantage. Any serious analysis of a potential U.S.–Nigeria security arrangement must therefore move beyond surface narratives and interrogate what may lie beneath the formal language of “partnership,” “assistance,” or “counterterrorism cooperation.”

Power, Security, and the Logic of Interests

The United States is the most powerful military actor in the international system, but it is also one of the most interest-driven. Its security engagements abroad are rarely pro bono. They are typically embedded in wider strategic objectives, access, influence, intelligence, economic leverage, or geopolitical positioning.

Nigeria, as Africa’s most populous country and one of its largest economies, occupies a strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa. It sits at the crossroads of regional security challenges: terrorism in the Sahel, maritime insecurity in the Atlantic, energy politics, and great-power competition increasingly playing out across Africa. From Washington’s perspective, Nigeria is not merely a counterterrorism partner; it is a strategic node.

This does not automatically make cooperation harmful. States routinely partner for mutual benefit. The danger arises when asymmetries of power allow one party to shape outcomes disproportionately, often in ways that only become visible over time.

Security Assistance and the Price of Dependency

One of the central risks of relying heavily on external military assistance is the gradual erosion of strategic autonomy. When foreign intelligence, logistics, training, or operational capabilities become deeply embedded in a country’s security system, decision-making can subtly shift. What begins as assistance can evolve into dependence.

Nigeria’s security challenges, terrorism, banditry, separatist agitations, and organised crime are real and severe. Yet history shows that external military solutions rarely resolve fundamentally political and socio-economic problems. Where foreign powers dominate security responses, local institutions often weaken rather than strengthen.

The architecture of Nigeria’s security sector must therefore be interrogated: would deeper U.S. involvement enhance indigenous capacity, or would it entrench a model where critical intelligence, surveillance, and strike capabilities remain externally controlled? The long-term consequences of the latter would be profound.

Lessons from History: Selective Engagement and Strategic Withdrawal

The global record of U.S. engagement offers sobering lessons. History offers instructive parallels. The United States has repeatedly demonstrated that its commitment to crises abroad is conditional, selective, and interest-based. This pattern reflects a broader strategic ethos: the U.S. engages where interests are clear and costs predictable, and retreats where outcomes are uncertain or public support wanes. The Somali example, where strategic gains remain elusive despite years of involvement, illustrates the limits of a militarised model unsupported by robust political and development frameworks. It serves as a cautionary tale for countries like Nigeria, where public expectations may outstrip diplomatic realities.

In Liberia, despite historical ties, the U.S. response to the early stages of political collapse was hesitant, allowing the crisis to spiral into prolonged civil war before limited intervention occurred. In southern Africa, U.S. policy during the Angolan War of Independence and the apartheid era was shaped less by humanitarian considerations than by Cold War calculations. Support, opposition, or indifference shifted as global strategic priorities changed.

These precedents underline a critical reality: alliances are not guarantees. When interests diverge, even long-standing relationships can be recalibrated or abandoned. Nigeria must therefore ask not only what assistance it might receive today, but what vulnerabilities it might inherit tomorrow.

Geopolitics in an Age of Global Competition

Across West Africa, the U.S.–Nigeria security dialogue has centred on terrorism and extremist violence. Washington frames its assistance as intelligence sharing, precision strikes, and capacity building within the parameters of respect for Nigerian sovereignty. Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry has emphasised mutual commitments to regional stability, human rights, and the strengthening of domestic security institutions.

Yet strategic partnerships are rarely limited to the language of cooperation. They are embedded in the geopolitical contest for influence among great powers, particularly in regions rich with natural resources, growing markets, and strategic corridors. Nigeria sits squarely in this context, as Africa’s most populous state, a leading oil exporter, and a key player in regional economic integration. Its appeal to global powers is therefore not abstract; it is rooted in strategic calculations that go far beyond counterterrorism.

Therefore, any U.S.–Nigeria security arrangement must also be understood within the context of intensifying global competition. Africa is no longer a peripheral theatre; it is a contested space where the United States, China, Russia, and other powers pursue influence through infrastructure, arms sales, security cooperation, and diplomacy.

A closer military alignment with Washington may affect Nigeria’s relations with other global actors. Strategic non-alignment, long a pillar of Nigeria’s foreign policy tradition, could be strained. Economic partnerships, defence procurement options, and diplomatic flexibility may narrow as security ties deepen.

Geopolitics is rarely zero-sum in theory, but it often becomes so in practice when security commitments harden into expectations of loyalty.

The Political Economy of Security

Security partnerships are never purely military; they are also economic. Defence cooperation often comes with contracts, procurement obligations, training packages, and technological dependencies. Arms purchases, maintenance agreements, and intelligence-sharing arrangements can lock countries into long-term financial commitments.

For Nigeria, already grappling with fiscal pressures, unemployment, and development deficits, the question is whether external security arrangements generate net national value. Do they stimulate domestic defence industries, strengthen institutions, and transfer skills? Or do they primarily benefit foreign contractors and external suppliers?

There is also the risk that security-focused partnerships divert attention from governance reforms, economic inclusion, and social investment, the very factors that underpin sustainable peace.

Sovereignty, Dependency, and the Reconfiguration of Nigeria’s Domestic Security Architecture

Security cooperation between states and external powers occupies a central place in contemporary security governance, particularly in states confronting persistent internal threats. While such cooperation is often justified on the grounds of capacity enhancement and threat mitigation, it simultaneously raises complex questions regarding sovereignty, institutional autonomy, and long-term security sustainability. In the Nigerian case, the evolution of the domestic security architecture has been deeply influenced by decades of foreign military assistance, including training programmes, intelligence-sharing arrangements, logistical support, and the transfer of defence equipment. These interventions have contributed to short-term operational gains; however, they also risk generating structural dependencies if not embedded within a coherent framework of indigenous institutional development.

From a political economy perspective, reliance on external security assistance can distort domestic priorities and weaken incentives for internal reform. When critical intelligence, advanced surveillance capabilities, or specialised strike capacities are externally sourced, domestic institutions may become subordinated to foreign strategic preferences. This dynamic risks transforming security cooperation from a mechanism of capacity building into one of dependency, thereby constraining national autonomy in strategic decision-making. Over time, such dependency can erode the professionalism, accountability, and self-sufficiency of national security institutions, particularly when foreign assistance substitutes for rather than complements domestic investment.

An equally significant concern relates to transparency and democratic oversight. Security agreements between states are frequently negotiated within executive domains and framed in technical or classified terms that limit public and legislative scrutiny. Instruments such as status-of-forces agreements, intelligence-sharing protocols, basing arrangements, and operational exemptions often remain shielded from open debate. In Nigeria, where democratic consolidation remains an ongoing process, the limited disclosure of such arrangements raises normative and institutional concerns. Without robust parliamentary oversight, judicial review, and civil society engagement, it becomes difficult to ascertain the legal boundaries, accountability mechanisms, and long-term implications of external security partnerships.

The absence of transparency not only undermines democratic governance but also reshapes state–society relations in problematic ways. Public expectations of security provision may increasingly be projected onto external actors rather than domestic institutions, thereby weakening the social contract between the state and its citizens. This phenomenon creates what may be described as a paradox of protection: as foreign involvement expands, domestic legitimacy may decline, particularly when external actors operate beyond the reach of national accountability frameworks.

Historically, the volatility of external security commitments further compounds these risks. International security partnerships are inherently contingent upon shifting geopolitical interests, domestic political calculations in donor states, and evolving strategic priorities. When these conditions change, external actors may reduce or terminate their engagement with little regard for the institutional consequences within host states. Empirical evidence from multiple contexts demonstrates that such withdrawals often leave behind weakened security institutions, fragmented command structures, and unresolved security challenges. In this sense, dependency on external security assistance can produce a form of strategic vulnerability rather than resilience.

Within this broader context, Nigeria’s engagement with external security partners must be assessed not solely in terms of immediate tactical outcomes but through a long-term institutional and sovereignty lens. Sustainable security requires the strengthening of indigenous capabilities, the reinforcement of civilian oversight mechanisms, and the integration of security policy within broader governance and development strategies. External cooperation, where necessary, should therefore be conditional, transparent, and explicitly oriented toward institutional transfer rather than operational substitution.

In sum, while external security cooperation may offer short-term advantages in addressing urgent threats, its long-term implications for sovereignty, democratic accountability, and institutional autonomy are far from neutral. For Nigeria, the challenge lies in navigating these partnerships in a manner that enhances national capacity without reproducing patterns of dependency or undermining the foundational principles of democratic security governance.

Nigeria’s Security Architecture at a Crossroads

Nigeria’s long-term security cannot be outsourced without significant risks to sovereignty, institutional coherence, and democratic accountability. While external security partnerships may offer short-term tactical advantages, such as intelligence support, training, or technological assistance, they cannot substitute for a coherent, nationally owned security strategy rooted in local realities. Sustainable security architecture depends fundamentally on the professionalism and discipline of the armed forces, accountable and community-oriented policing, effective intelligence coordination, inclusive political governance, economic opportunity, and the cultivation of public trust between the state and its citizens.

These pillars are mutually reinforcing. Where armed forces operate without accountability, policing lacks legitimacy, or intelligence institutions function in isolation, security interventions tend to be reactive rather than preventive. Similarly, persistent socio-economic exclusion and political marginalisation create fertile conditions for insecurity that no amount of external military assistance can permanently resolve. Security, in this sense, is not merely a matter of force, but of governance, legitimacy, and social cohesion.

The risk arises when foreign assistance undermines rather than strengthens these foundations. Security cooperation that privileges kinetic force over institutional reform, secrecy over democratic oversight, or externally driven solutions over local ownership may exacerbate insecurity in the long term. Such approaches can weaken domestic capacity, distort policy priorities, and reduce incentives for internal reform, thereby entrenching dependency rather than resilience. In extreme cases, they may alienate local communities, erode public confidence, and create new grievances that fuel the very threats they are intended to address.

A Call for Strategic Clarity

This critique should not be misconstrued as an argument for isolationism or hostility toward the United States or other external partners. Strategic partnerships are a normal and often necessary feature of international politics, particularly in an interconnected security environment. The central issue is not whether Nigeria should engage external actors, but on what terms, to what extent, and with what long-term vision.

Nigeria must therefore engage from a position of strategic clarity. This requires the articulation of clear national objectives, clearly defined red lines regarding sovereignty and accountability, and explicit expectations about the scope and duration of external involvement. Security cooperation should be transparent, subject to democratic oversight, time-bound, and explicitly oriented toward capacity-building and institutional transfer. External support must remain subordinate to national strategy, rather than reshaping it in response to external priorities.

History offers cautionary lessons in this regard. Countries that enter asymmetric security relationships without rigorous scrutiny often discover, sometimes belatedly, that what was framed as assistance carried obligations that constrained future policy choices, limited strategic autonomy, and complicated domestic governance. While history does not determine outcomes, it provides critical instruction. For Nigeria, the challenge is to learn from these precedents and pursue a security strategy that balances cooperation with autonomy, immediacy with sustainability, and tactical necessity with long-term national interest.

Beyond the excitement or anxiety surrounding alleged foreign military involvement lies a deeper and more consequential question: what kind of security partner does Nigeria wish to be, and on what terms?

In an international system governed by interests rather than sentiment, vigilance is not cynicism; it is prudence. Nigeria’s challenge is not merely to defeat immediate threats, but to do so in a way that preserves sovereignty, strengthens institutions, and secures long-term national autonomy. Security gained at the cost of strategic independence is rarely secure at all.

Oluwadare is a

Professor of Political Science,

Nigerian Defence Academy,

Kaduna