Reckless US Interventions in Venezuela: The 

Politics of International Law of Non-Intervention

Bola A. Akinterinwa

International law, also referred to as jus or ius gentium, meaning Law of Nations, is not simply a field of study, but more interestingly a very controversial subject of international politics that paves way for complex manoeuvrings in the quest for global peace and security. In this regard, some countries, like Nigeria, take international law as a big deal to the extent of making it a constitutional foreign policy objective. As provided in Section 19 of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution as amended, it is made clear that Nigeria is more interested in global order than in the protection of Nigeria’s own national order. In other words, Nigeria can be rightly considered an internationalist or a globalist in the true sense of the word.

On the contrary, the United States under President Donald J. Trump is an advocate of nationalism and protectionism, and a vehement opponent of multilateralism that is not protective of U.S. interests. For instance, last week Thursday, 8th January, 2026, President Trump reportedly ordered the withdrawal of U.S. membership of sixty-six international organisations in implementation of his ‘America First’ policy. In the eyes of Donald Trump, the affected organisations operate ‘contrary to U.S national interests, security, economic prosperity or sovereignty.’ Besides, the withdrawals ‘will end American taxpayer funding and involvement in entities that advance globalist agendas over U.S. priorities, or that address important issues inefficiently or ineffectively.’ As further noted by newdiplomatng.com, ‘many of these bodies promote radical climate policies, global governance and ideological programmes that conflict with U.S. sovereignty and economic strength.’

Thus, the United States is much less interested in respecting international law, regardless of whatever obligations created by U.S. membership of any international organisation or international law. While one of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives is to respect international law and treaty obligations, the U.S. foreign policy objective consciously disregards international law of non-intervention contrary to the provision of Article(4) of the UN Charter.

Reality of International Law of Non-Intervention

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits intervention or threats of use of force in settling international disputes. If Nigeria says her foreign policy objectives include respecting international law which some countries do not respect, it simply means that Nigeria is an advocate of the rule of pacta sunt servanda, or sanctity of agreements, and therefore cannot be expected not to respect the non-intervention principle as provided for in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Put differently, apart from Section 19(a) which stipulates that Nigeria’s foreign policy objective shall be the ‘promotion and protection of the national interest,’ the other four objectives are all international in character. The objective is to promote and protect ‘African integration and support for African unity (Section 19(b). This objective is consistent with the Afrocentric principles of Africa as cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy from 1960 to 1976 and centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy from 1976 to date. However, the objective is extra-Nigeria in design and implementation.

Section 19(c) says the objective shall be to promote ‘international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations.’ There is goodness in seeking universal peace that does not exist and that has the potential not to exist. The likelihood of any existence of universal peace is, at best, a dream. And true enough, African leaders generally believe that no meaningful development can exist in the absence of peace and security. We have no qualms with the ‘promotion of a just world economic order,’ as provided under Section 19(e) but it is again a meaningless objective because international law and relations are a conflict system of order and counter-order that always generates an encounter that also results in disorder. It is basically a system of self-survival first, and caring less for what happens to others. This makes a nonsense of any quest for international cooperation and quest for international peace and security.

Perhaps more concerning and disturbing is Section 19(d) which says Nigeria’s foreign policy shall be the ‘respect for international law and treaty obligations, as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication.’ This objective is consistent with the UN Charter. However, it shows the non-seriousness of Nigeria’s foreign policy objective: why should a foreign policy objective simply be to respect international law which is not a big deal for most major powers in international relations? What does it mean to France, Britain, and U.S. who have aggressed Syria, or Russia that has invaded Ukraine? What about Turkey in Syria? It is against this background that we want to explicate U.S. reckless intervention in Venezuela and the myth and reality of international law of non-intervention.

Put differently, pleading the case of non-intervention in the domestic concerns of another sovereign state must also address the concerns of the intervening state. What makes U.S. intervention in Venezuela reckless is not the decision to intervene or the mania of the intervention but the objective of seeking to administer Venezuela as a constituent State of the U.S. Without jot of doubt, as noted above, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter outlaws the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any other state. Threatening the political independence of another sovereign state is strongly prohibited regardless of the self-serving interpretation of the article.

The United States is on record to have been engaging in regime change in several countries. As recalled by Jeffrey D, Sachs in his briefing of the UN Security Council on Venezuela on January 5, 2026, there were 70 attempted US regime-change operations between 1947 and 1989 alone based on Lindsey O’Orourke’s book, entitled Covert Regime Change. More important, in the period from 1989 to date, U.S. regime-change operations ‘included, among the most consequential, Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), Syria (from 2011), Honduras (2009), Ukraine (2014), and Venezuela (from 2002 onward).’ And perhaps more interestingly is the method of achieving the regime change: ‘open warfare, covert intelligence operations, instigations of unrest, support for armed groups, manipulation of mass and social media, bribery of military and civilian officials, targeted assassinations, false-flag operations, and economic warfare aimed at collapsing civilian life, to borrow the words of Jeffrey Sachs.

This means that the United States has actually been committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, apparently for politico-economic motivations that are detrimental to the protection of international law. This is therefore more about politics and complete disregard for international law, which provides for a domaine réservé in which no sovereign state can intervene. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter is also very clear on non-intervention based on several principles. For instance, the principle of sovereign equality does not allow for intervention: all countries are sovereign and equal, and therefore have the right to manage their own affairs without external interferences.

This is more so with the principle of domaine réservé which admits that every state has its own essential domestic jurisdiction where intervention is impermissible. In this regard, impermissibility is in the area of armed intervention, directly or indirectly by way of threatening. Economic coercion is prohibited. For example, taking sanctionary measures aimed at subordinating the sovereign rights of another state is not allowed. Subversive activities by way of overthrowing another government, organising financing and assisting armed and terrorist organisations are unlawful. The same is true of electoral interferences aimed at hacking systems, manipulating elections, or spreading disinformation are prohibited.

Even though international law provides for some exceptions to the application of the principle of non-intervention, there is an ongoing debate on the myths and reality of the principle in international practice. First on the exceptions, Article 51, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows for intervention when there are threats to peace. In this regard, based on the rule of sovereignty, there can be lawful individual or collective intervention when there is consent from the legitimate government or when there are threats to international peace and security. When a sovereign state is threatened or is a victim of unprovoked attack or aggression, there is room for legitimate self-defence, but eventually subject to the UNSC approval.

The IR2P (International Responsibility to Protect) cannot but be another exception in the sense that the international community has zero tolerance for ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. When Heads of States or of Governments are internationally perceived to be unwilling or incapable of preventing any of the foregoing international infractions, the international community withholds the responsibility to intervene and protect.

As regards the ongoing debate on the rule of non-intervention, especially as to what constitutes interference and intervention, the new thinking is that even though the non-intervention rule protects the state to decide its own future by itself, such protection is now being considered not absolute in light of human rights abuses and threats to global peace and security. Put interrogatively, how do we reconcile the prohibition of intervention with the need to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, etc.? There is also the question of legality and legitimacy. Unilateral intervention can be legally questionable but humanitarian interventions can be politico-morally legitimate. How do we reconcile them? To what extent is the rule of non-intervention now sustainable and lawful in application? It is against this background that the U.S interventions in Venezuela are interrogated.

US Politics and Reckless Interventions

There are many issues in US-Venezuelan bilateral relations. One major issue is how to reconcile Venezuela’s quest for self-identity and autonomy and the U.S quest for control of Venezuela, in particular, and the whole of western hemisphere, in general. Relationship between the two countries has generally been rough, especially as from 1999 when Hugo Chávez became the President of Venezuela and he opted for socialism and anti-US imperialism. Venezuela accused the U.S. under President George W. Bush of supporting the 2002 coup against Chávez.

In September 2008, Venezuela expelled US Ambassador in solidarity with Bolivia, following the accusation of his cooperating with some violent anti-government groups in the country. Again, in February 2014, three American diplomats were declared personae non-grata allegedly for sponsoring violence. And perhaps more disturbingly, in 2019, during the Presidential election crisis, the U.S. refused to accept Nicolás Maduro as President of Venezuela. The U.S. opted for Juan Guaidó, the President of the National Assembly, as interim president. This prompted Maduro to announce the breaking of ties with the U.S. The U.S. was much infuriated as a result.

The crescendo of the bad relationship was reached in 2025 with the designation of Tren de Aragua and Cartel of the Suns as terrorist organisations, as well as sending Venezuelans accused of being members of the Venezuelan gang, Tren de Aragua, to the CECOT (Center for the Confinement of Terrorism) in El Salvador. The CECOT is a maximum security prison. In August 2025, Donald Trump directed that military force be used against Latin American drug cartels, described as narcoterrorists. In this regard, USS Iwo Jima, and its amphibious Ready Group, were deployed.

This was followed by the deployment of USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group.

As from mid-December 2025, the U.S began intercepting and attacking crude oil tankers, as well as imposing a naval quarantine on sanctioned vessels en route to or from Venezuela. The ultimate intention of this build-up called Operation Southern Spear in the Caribbean, is to redesignate the Nicolás Maduro government as a terrorist organisation. Again, as from September 2025, the U.S. began to carry out ‘strikes against alleged drug boats as part of a military build up in the Caribbean Sea.’ This led to the reckless U.S. military intervention and capturing of Maduro and his wife on January 3, 2026. But why is this so and why should it be so?

US relationship with Venezuela is more about economic interest than fighting narcoterrorism. Venezuela is a renowned petro-state and home of the world’s largest oil reserves. Venezuela was considered the fourth-highest GDP per capita globally in the post-World War II era. The richness of Venezuela’s oil wealth prompted its being called ‘the Millionaire of America.’ This is one major reason for U.S. interest in Venezuela. The U.S cannot afford the luxury of allowing Venezuela to exist under the orbital influence of Russia or socialism. Consequently, seeking to contain narcoterrorism is, at best, secondary a reason for the recidivist US interventions in the country.  Giving the excuses of political corruption, poor governance, poverty and hyperinflation that started under the late President Hugo Chávez are secondary reasons. We are not unaware of the fact that Maduro, a mentee of Chávez, became authoritarian after winning election by a very narrow margin following Chávez’s death in 2013. In fact, more than 8 million Venezuelans were forced to seek greener pastures elsewhere. The United States is not interested in this development. The 2018 and 2024 presidential elections were disputed and the U.S. refuse to recognise the legitimacy of Maduro’s victories.

Perhaps more disturbingly and interestingly, there are two developments that are quite noteworthy about the U.S. reckless military bombardment of Venezuela. The first is that the United States does not recognise the legitimacy of the presidency of Maduro. Now, following his capture and sending him to New York for possible prosecution, the same Donald Trump government is indicating much interest in recognising the legitimacy of the Vice President of Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez, who has served under Maduro. Eduardo Gamarra, a Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Florida International University, has rightly queried: ‘if the president was illegitimate, what makes the vice president legitimate and the person who is going to continue?’ (Vide Ayesha Rascoe, “Venezuela is the latest in the US long history of interventions in Latin America,” Texas Public Radio, tpr.org, January 4, 2026).

The second point of note is that Donald Trump made known to the whole world the truth about the objective of his intervention in Venezuela at a press conference following the capture of Maduro. As reported by the Guardian.com (London), Donald Trump said ‘American dominance in the western hemisphere will never be questioned again.’ This point is most unfortunate because of its underlining myopia. The U.S. is able to pontificate now because of its military strength which is not rivalled by any Latin American country.

But who says that there will never be any Latin American country with a development parity and capable of having the potential to challenge the United States? Who says that there can never be a decline in U.S. power and influence in the foreseeable future? Why are American policy makers not thinking that Trump’s policies can garner general global hostility against the United States in such a way that US greatness can be easily thrown sooner than later in the garbage of history? Who also says that U.S. dominance beyond Latin America or the Western Hemisphere will not be questioned? Can US hegemony in its immediate neighbourhood prevent global hostility against U.S. global interests?

Whatever is the case, and without iota of doubt, the issue of recognition of government, and not of State, is also raised here. The U.S. does not recognise the legitimacy of the election of President Maduro. After his removal, his Vice President suddenly becomes legitimate to be recognised. Does international law recognise the entirety of a government or the constituent parts? Can a law really be divisible in application? Is law not holistic in character?

Additionally, Donald Trump is on record to have said in response to the question raised by The New York Times on whether there was any limitation to his global powers that ‘yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me. I don’t need international law…. I’m not looking to hurt people.’ Thus, President Trump accepts international law only to the extent of his being the final arbiter when U.S interest is involved. In fact, he has queried the definition of international law. The universally-acknowledged definition of international being the law of nations is meaningless to Donald Trump. In the Napoleon-style of l’Etat c’est moi, (The State is Me), the US president is similarly saying that ‘international law is Donald Trump or Donald Trump is International Law.’ This is why and how Donald Trump is carelessly endangering the lives of Americans in the world. Aggressing a sovereign state, getting several Americans killed in the process, also killing several innocent Venezuelans cannot be justified under the rule of self-defence. It is a manifestation of impermissible intervention in international law and relations.

And true enough, the most recent U.S. aggression on Venezuela is particularly reckless and raises more unanswered fundamental questions. For instance, there is no disputing the fact that Venezuela has always been seen as a security threat to the United States to the extent that President Donald Trump even contemplated the possibility of invading Venezuela in 2017. President Barak Obama put the concerns of the United States thus: ‘Venezuela is an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.’ Perceived as such, is it reasonable to seek the respect for international law to one’s detriment? Does it make any good sense to put a trust in a law or in an organisation that is not capable of ensuring one’s national security? Should a country put its national security in the care of international law or in the United Nations? Answers to these questions are not easy to give because, grosso modo, it is generally the weaker Member States of the international community that seek peace, that complain about non-respect for international law, and that acquiesce to the de facto rule of might is always right. Powerful countries only respect international law when it is convenient. For Nigeria to make the respect of international law and treaty obligations a foreign policy objective is myopically most unfortunate. Nigerians should commend President Bola Ahmed Tinubu for making strategic autonomy the fulcrum and guide of his administration and for his Foreign Minister, Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar for efficiently and effectively translating the policy into concrete foreign policy actions.