Impeachment: Rivers of Crises

In the past few weeks, Rivers State has been on the boil, consequent upon the concerted attempt by majority of its House of Assembly members to impeach Governor Siminalayi Fubara and his Deputy, Professor Ngozi Odu who only recently returned to office after a six-month hiatus, waiting out their suspension. The House of Assembly members had transmitted a letter to the Rivers State Chief Judge, requesting that he constitute a Seven-Man Panel to investigate Governor Sim Fubara and his Deputy, with a view to impeaching them. But, the Chief Judge of the State, Honourable Justice Simeon Amadi refused to accede to their request, stating that his hands were “fettered”, due to several court orders. In this Discourse, Dr  Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN; Sylvester Udemezue and Jide Ojo dissect the issues in the unfolding drama in Rivers State, and their far reaching implications for the State and the larger Nigerian polity

Weaponisation of Impeachment in Rivers State: A Constitutional Aberration

Dr Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN

Introduction

Impeachment under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, is not a political bludgeon to be deployed at will. It is a grave constitutional mechanism, carefully designed to balance accountability with stability. What is currently unfolding in Rivers State, represents a troubling departure from this constitutional design.

Critical Issues

At the heart of the controversy are two critical issues: the refusal of the Chief Judge to constitute a seven-man investigative panel, and the propriety or otherwise of the lawmakers purporting to initiate the impeachment process.

Section 188(5) of the Constitution provides that the Chief Judge shall constitute a seven-man panel upon receipt of a valid request from the Speaker of the House of Assembly. While the word “shall” suggests a mandatory obligation, constitutional interpretation has never been blind to context.

The Chief Judge’s role, though administrative, is not mechanical. He is not a conveyor belt, required to process a constitutionally tainted request. Where there are fundamental defects such as doubts about the legitimacy of the House, the status of the Speaker, quorum, or compliance with earlier stages of Section 188, the Chief Judge is constitutionally entitled to decline participation. To do otherwise, would amount to judicial endorsement of illegality.

In this particular case in Rivers, an order of court restrained the Chief Judge of the State from constituting the desired Panel. Since the order, whether rightly or wrongly given, has not been set aside by the same court or on appeal, it is to be obeyed by all authorities in the country, including the Chief Judge.

Nigerian courts have repeatedly affirmed that, impeachment proceedings must strictly comply with constitutional procedure. Any deviation, however minor, renders the process null and void. The order may have been given, based on an affidavit that may have alluded to that deviation. However, the motion on notice will still be heard, and a decision will one way or the other, be reached.

Can the Lawmakers Even Initiate Impeachment?

This is the more fundamental question. Impeachment can only be initiated by a properly constituted House of Assembly. The Constitution is explicit: legislative action requires quorum, institutional cohesion, and procedural regularity. Political disagreement does not confer constitutional authority. Numbers, procedure, and legitimacy do.

The law is settled that you cannot place something on nothing and expect it to stand. An impeachment process founded on procedural illegitimacy, is stillborn.

Impeachment Isn’t Political Warfare

Impeachment is a quasi-judicial process, not a tool of political vendetta. Its weaponisation in times of executive/legislative conflict, undermines democratic stability and invites judicial intervention. History shows that courts will not hesitate to strike down impeachments driven by political expediency rather than constitutional fidelity.

The refusal of the Chief Judge to constitute a Panel in the face of an express court order, although an ex-parte order, is neither defiance nor abdication. It is judicial restraint.

Impeachment must remain what the Constitution intended it to be: a shield for accountability, not a sword for political combat and hostility. Enough said.

Dr Monday Onyekachi Ubani, SAN, former Chairman, NBA Section on Special Interest and Development Law (SPIDEL)

Rivers State Assembly and the Chief Judge’s Refusal to Constitute a Probe Panel

A Legal Appraisal of Governor Fubara’s Second Impeachment Crisis

Sylvester Udemezue

Background

The second impeachment crisis involving Governor Siminalayi Fubara of Rivers State and his Deputy, Professor Ngozi Odu, is one of the most intense constitutional and political confrontations in the State’s recent history. It unfolded amid a prolonged power struggle between the Executive and the Rivers State House of Assembly, raising fundamental questions about constitutional compliance, separation of powers, and the limits of judicial involvement in impeachment proceedings. The crisis formally crystallised on 8 January, 2026, when the House of Assembly issued and purportedly served Notices of Allegations of Gross Misconduct on the Governor and his Deputy. The notices, signed by the Speaker, Hon. Martin Amaewhule, were supported by 26 members of the Assembly. Soon after, however, the process became mired in controversy over service and procedure. Reports indicated that several days after the resolution, the Governor had not been personally served with the notice, fuelling speculation about procedural defects, political manoeuvring, or a stalled process. There were also fears about whether the four Honourable members loyal to Governor Fubara were carried along, as required by the proviso to Section 188(2) of the Constitution.

On 16 January, 2026, 26 members of the House passed a Motion resolving to investigate the allegations and, directed the Speaker to request the Chief Judge of Rivers State to constitute a seven-man investigative panel, thereby escalating the crisis to a critical constitutional stage. However, a turning point occurred on 20 January, 2026, when the Chief Judge, Hon Justice Amadi, declined the Assembly’s request to constitute the panel. In a letter responding to the Speaker’s request under Section 188, the Chief Judge cited concerns relating to judicial independence and procedural propriety. This refusal introduced a novel constitutional dilemma: whether a Chief Judge has discretion to decline a request that appears constitutionally mandated, and the legal consequences of such refusal for an ongoing impeachment process. It is this tension between constitutional text, institutional roles, and political reality, that this article interrogates. By examining the impeachment proceedings against Governor Fubara and his Deputy (particularly the Chief Judge’s refusal to constitute a probe panel), the article assesses the legality, propriety, and constitutional implications of the actions of the key actors within Nigeria’s impeachment framework.

A Summary of the Impeachment Procedure Under Section 188 of the Constitution

Impeachment proceedings against a Governor or Deputy Governor under Section 188 of the 1999 Constitution, are governed by a strictly sequenced and mandatory procedure, with which exact compliance is constitutionally required. The process begins with a Notice of Allegation of Gross Misconduct, which must be in writing, contain detailed particulars, be signed by not less than one-third of the members of the House of Assembly, and be presented to the Speaker. Upon receipt, the Speaker must, within seven (7) days, serve the Notice on the Governor and circulate copies to all members of the House. At this stage, “gross misconduct” is defined by Section 188(11) as a grave violation or breach of the Constitution, or any misconduct which, in the opinion of the House, amounts to gross misconduct. The Governor is entitled to respond, and any reply must be circulated by the Speaker to all members before further steps are taken. Within fourteen (14) days of the presentation of the Notice (whether or not a reply is submitted), the House must decide by motion and without debate, whether to investigate the allegations. This motion must be supported by not less than a two-thirds majority of all members; failure to attain this majority automatically terminates the process. Where the motion succeeds, the Speaker must, within seven (7) days, request the Chief Judge to constitute a seven-member investigative panel composed of persons of unquestionable integrity who are not members of the public service, the legislature, or any political party. The panel must conduct its inquiry in accordance with procedures prescribed by the House, afford the Governor the right to defend himself personally or through Counsel, and submit its report within three (3) months of appointment. Upon receipt of the report, the House proceeds to final consideration. If the panel exonerates the Governor, the Constitution bars any further proceedings. If the allegations are upheld, the House must, within fourteen (14) days, consider and, by a two-thirds majority resolution, adopt the report, whereupon the Governor is removed from office with immediate effect. Throughout, strict compliance with Section 188 is mandatory. While courts will not examine the merits of the allegations, they retain jurisdiction to intervene for procedural non-compliance, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Inakoju v Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423.

The Ouster Clause and Justiciability of Impeachment Proceedings in Nigeria

Questions on impeachment under the Nigerian Constitution often generate confusion, because two related but distinct issues are conflated: the constitutional power to impeach, and the constitutional procedure for impeachment. This distinction was authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Inakoju v Adeleke (Supra) (the Ladoja case), the leading authority on the justiciability of impeachment proceedings in Nigeria. In the case, which arose from the impeachment of Oyo State Governor, Rasheed Ladoja, the Supreme Court held that the purported impeachment was a nullity, due to flagrant non-compliance with Section 188 of the 1999 Constitution. The Court affirmed that although impeachment is a political process, it is constitutionally regulated, and any departure from the prescribed procedure renders the entire exercise void. The decision underscored the Judiciary’s role, in protecting constitutionalism and the rule of law. The Court drew a clear line, between power and procedure. On the one hand, it held that courts lack jurisdiction to question the substantive power of a House of Assembly to initiate and carry out impeachment, as that power is expressly vested in the Legislature by Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution. The motives, wisdom, or political justification for impeachment, are matters exclusively within the legislative domain. On the other hand, the Court held that the Judiciary retains jurisdiction to inquire into allegations of non-compliance with the mandatory procedural steps in Sections 143 or 188(1)–(9). Impeachment is therefore, justiciable to the limited extent of ensuring strict adherence to constitutional procedure. In this context, the Supreme Court interpreted the ouster clauses in Sections 143(10) and 188(10) as excluding judicial review only of the substantive resolutions or opinions of the House (such as whether conduct amounts to “gross misconduct”), but not of procedural compliance. Where constitutional safeguards are breached, the courts are both competent and duty-bound to intervene. Accordingly, impeachment under the Nigerian Constitution is not a non-justiciable political question in cases of procedural irregularity; the courts act as constitutional gatekeepers while refraining from adjudicating the political merits of the allegations. Thus, although legislative acts are generally non-justiciable, courts will assume jurisdiction where the Constitution prescribes a specific procedure and that procedure is breached, as the courts are guardians of the Constitution.

Competence of the High Court of Rivers State in Impeachment-Related Proceedings

The High Court of Rivers State is competent (it shares concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal High Court) to entertain matters arising from impeachment proceedings against the sitting Governor of the State, not to determine the merits of the allegations, but to adjudicate issues of constitutional compliance and legal rights. Under Section 272 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the State High Court has broad jurisdiction over civil proceedings involving the existence, extent, or enforcement of legal rights, powers, duties, or obligations, subject only to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251. Accordingly, where impeachment proceedings raise questions of compliance with the mandatory procedures in Section 188 of the Constitution, such disputes fall within the supervisory jurisdiction of the State High Court or the Federal High Court, which may enforce constitutional safeguards and the rule of law, without intruding into the political discretion of the House of Assembly.

Legal Propriety (or Otherwise) of the Rivers State Chief Judge’s Refusal to Constitute a Probe Panel

a) Is the Chief Judge Bound to Constitute a Panel: The duty of a State Chief Judge to constitute an investigative panel under Section 188(5) of the Constitution, is neither mechanical nor automatic. It is a constitutional duty, conditioned on prior strict compliance by the House of Assembly with the mandatory steps in section 188(1)-(4). Although the power to initiate impeachment and request a panel lies with the House, the Chief Judge’s role must be exercised in fidelity to the Constitution. As the Supreme Court held in Inakoju v Adeleke(2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423, impeachment is a constitutionally regulated process, and any step taken in breach of constitutional requirements is a nullity. The Chief Judge therefore, cannot be compelled to act on a constitutionally defective request, as the Constitution does not mandate participation in an unlawful or incomplete impeachment process. The Chief Judge is entitled, indeed, constitutionally obliged, to decline a request where it is apparent that the House has failed to comply with fundamental procedural requirements under Section 188, even absent a court order. This duty flows from Section 1(1) and (2) of the Constitution, which proclaim constitutional supremacy and binds all authorities to its provisions. To constitute a panel in the face of clear breaches (such as improper service, failure to secure the required majority, or premature invocation of Section 188(5)) would amount to aiding a constitutional violation and undermining the rule of law. The proper course is to notify the Speaker of the defects, and insist on due process. As affirmed in Inakoju v Adeleke (Supra), procedural non-compliance vitiates impeachment ab initio. Where the Chief Judge declines on this basis, the House’s remedy lies in challenging that decision in court. In Abiodun v C.J. Kwara State (2007) LPELR-8308(CA), the Court of Appeal confirmed that courts may examine both compliance with the two-thirds requirement, and the Chief Judge’s exercise of discretion in empanelling a panel where challenged.

b) Duty to Decline Where a Subsisting Court Order Exists: One of the reasons offered by the CJ of Rivers State for declining to set up a panel, is that his office was in in receipt of two separate interim orders issued by the High Court on 16 January, 2026 in Suit No.: OYHC/6/CS/2026 (Ngozi Odu v Amaewhule & 32 Ors) and Suit No.: OYHC/7/CS/2026 (Siminalayi Fubara v Amaewhule & 32 Ors). In both suits, the Honourable Chief Judge of Rivers State is named as the 32nd Defendant/Respondent, and the said interim orders were duly served on the CJ’s office on 16 January, 2026, the same date on which the orders were issued. It is respectfully submitted that, the Chief Judge is constitutionally bound to refuse to constitute a panel where a subsisting court order restrains further steps in the impeachment process. Obedience to court orders is a foundational element of the rule of law: all orders (whether regular, irregular, valid, or later found to be without jurisdiction) must be obeyed until set aside. This principle has been consistently affirmed by the Supreme Court, including in Rossek v A.C.B. Ltd. (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382; Oba Aladegbemi v Oba Fasanmade (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 81) 129; Adebayo v Johnson (1969) 1 All NLR 176; Komolafe v Omole (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 268) 213; and Oshiomhole v FGN(2004) LPELR-5188(CA), echoing Hadkinson v Hadkinson and Isaacs v Robertson. Acting in defiance of a subsisting order would amount to contempt of court, and a violation of constitutional supremacy under Section 1(2). This position finds practical precedent in Ondo State, where the Chief Judge, Honourable Justice Olusegun Odusola, on 06 October, 2023 declined to constitute a panel in obedience to a subsisting restraining order of the Federal High Court in FHC/ABJ/CS/1294/2023, thereby upholding judicial authority. The Rivers State Chief Judge in the present instance, relied on Dele Abiodun v Honourable Chief Judge of Kwara State (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 109) 169, where the Court of Appeal nullified an impeachment process because the Chief Judge had constituted a panel in defiance of a court order, sternly condemning such conduct and reaffirming the Chief Judge’s paramount duty to obey and uphold the law.

1) The Rivers House of Assembly and Quod Approbo Non Reprobo

A critical feature of this matter is the Rivers State Chief Judge’s statement to the Speaker, that the House had lodged an appeal against the subsisting interim orders of the High Court, and that he had been served with the Notices of Appeal. He accordingly invoked the doctrine of lis pendens, noting that both parties and the court must await the outcome of the appeal. This is legally significant. Once a court order is made and remains subsisting, it binds all affected persons and authorities until set aside by due process. No litigant may approbate and reprobate, in the same proceedings. Having itself appealed against the High Court’s order, the Rivers State House of Assembly cannot simultaneously proceed as if that order does not exist, by requesting the Chief Judge to constitute an investigative panel. Such conduct violates the equitable principle of quod approbo non reprobo, which forbids a party from accepting and rejecting the same legal position to suit its convenience. By filing an appeal, the House has acknowledged the existence, binding force, and operative effect of the order, and is therefore legally and constitutionally bound to await the outcome of its appeal. It cannot lawfully take steps that undermine, pre-empt, or render nugatory a subsisting judicial decision.

Possible Legal Flaws that Could Justify Judicial Intervention

Judicial intervention is warranted where impeachment proceedings fail to comply with the mandatory procedural safeguards in Section 188 of the Constitution. Such defects go to the root of the process and render it incompetent. Illustrative instances include the following:

a) Failure by the Speaker to serve the Notice of Allegations on all members of the House, or to circulate the Governor’s reply (if any), as required by Section 188(2), is a fundamental breach, as it deprives legislators of the opportunity to consider the Governor’s defence before further steps are taken.

b) Where the motion to investigate is passed outside the mandatory fourteen (14) days from presentation of the Notice, or is not supported by a two-thirds majority of all members as required by Section 188(4), the impeachment automatically fails.

c) Non-compliance also arises where the Speaker’s request to the Chief Judge to constitute a seven-man panel is not made within seven (7) days of the resolution to investigate, contrary to Section 188(5). Likewise, where a panel exonerates the Governor, but the House nevertheless proceeds to remove him, such action is a nullity under Section 188(8). An illustration occurred in Ekiti State during the Fayose episode, where a Governor was removed despite a panel’s exoneration, an illegality that went unchallenged;

d) Even where a panel indicts the Governor, the process fails if the House does not, within fourteen (14) days, adopt the report by a two-thirds majority, as required by Section 188(9). This principle was applied in Plateau State, where the impeachment of Governor Joshua Dariye by only about 8 members (out of the 24-member House) was nullified and he was reinstated.

e) Impeachment proceedings conducted outside the chambers of the House of Assembly are unconstitutional. In Inakoju & Ors v Adeleke & Ors (Supra), the Supreme Court nullified Governor Ladoja’s impeachment because proceedings were held at D’Rovans Hotel, Ibadan. Similarly, in Balonwu & Ors v Obi & Anor (2007) LPELR-4255 (CA), Governor Peter Obi’s impeachment was set aside because, among other flaws, the proceedings occurred outside the Anambra State House of Assembly.

f) In Dapianlong & Ors v Dariye (SC 39/2007) [2007] NGSC 181, the Supreme Court held that Section 188(10) does not oust judicial jurisdiction where there is non-compliance with Section 188(1)–(9). The impeachment of Governor Joshua Dariye was declared unconstitutional due to multiple fatal defects, including initiation and conduct by a minority of six to eight members in a twenty-four-member House; improper reliance on Section 102; an undated and improperly signed Notice not served on the Governor or circulated to members; absence of valid two-thirds resolutions to investigate or adopt any report; an invalid request to the Acting Chief Judge; an improperly constituted panel that acted in defiance of subsisting court orders, submitted an interim report, and denied the Governor fair hearing; and proceedings conducted under coercive circumstances. Taken cumulatively, these violations rendered the impeachment, the panel proceedings, the report, and the purported removal null and void, necessitating the Governor’s reinstatement with all attendant rights and privileges.

2) Propriety of the Appeal Filed by the House of Assembly

The propriety of the House of Assembly’s appeal is open to serious doubt, given the nature of the order appealed against and settled procedural practice. The order in question was an interim ex-parte order, which is inherently provisional and liable to be varied or set aside by the same court upon application. The more appropriate course would have been to apply promptly to the High Court to discharge or vary the order, while filing a counter-affidavit and written address in response to the pending motion on notice. Immediate appeals against ex-parte orders are generally discouraged, as appellate courts emphasise that the court of first instance should first be given the opportunity to reconsider its interim ruling. Premature resort to appeal undermines judicial economy, and risks unnecessary delay. More significantly, by appealing rather than first seeking to set aside the order, the House acknowledged the subsistence and binding effect of the order, thereby triggering the doctrine of lis pendens and constraining itself from taking steps that could render the order nugatory. Accordingly, while the appeal may not be incompetent, it was procedurally ill-advised and counterproductive, in a sensitive constitutional process such as impeachment. A prompt application to set aside the ex-parte order, coupled with a robust response to the motion on notice, would have better preserved the House’s position, without attracting the constitutional and equitable consequences attendant upon appealing against a subsisting interim order.

3) A Word of Advice to the Warring Parties and the People of Rivers State

The protracted political crisis in Rivers State has reached a point of diminishing returns, where governance, public confidence, and institutional integrity are being sacrificed on the altar of political brinkmanship. As I advised in my earlier published write-up titled, “Enough of the Rivers State Crisis: Nigerians are Tired of the Drama – It’s Time to Govern, Not Grandstand”, the prevailing mood among Nigerians, is one of fatigue and frustration with endless power struggles that yield no tangible benefit to the people. Nigeria faces far graver national challenges (insecurity, economic hardship, unemployment, and failing social services) than to be continually consumed by one State’s political quarrels. The warring political actors must recognise that constitutional power is held in trust for the public good, not as a weapon for perpetual conflict. All sides (executive, legislature, and their supporters) are urged to de-escalate tensions, respect constitutional boundaries, obey court orders, and prioritise dialogue, compromise, and statesmanship over confrontation. Ultimately, the peace, development, and welfare of Rivers State must take precedence over factional victories, as history is kinder to leaders who chose peace and delivered good governance, than to those who merely grandstand loudly.

4) Conclusion

The impeachment crisis in Rivers State, starkly illustrates the dangers of politicising constitutionally regulated processes and disregarding the rule of law. While impeachment is a legitimate constitutional mechanism, it must be exercised strictly within the confines of the Constitution, with scrupulous adherence to due process, judicial authority, and institutional restraint. Any deviation (whether by the legislature, the executive, or ancillary actors) invites judicial intervention, and undermines democratic governance. The Constitution remains supreme, court orders remain binding, and no arm of government is above the law. It is only through fidelity to these foundational principles that constitutional democracy can be preserved, and public trust restored in Rivers State and Nigeria at large.

Sylvester Udemezue (Udems), Legal Practitioner

The Stalled Impeachment Move on Governor Sim Fubara

Jide Ojo

Introduction

Governor Siminalaye Fubara of Rivers State has become a cat with nine lives, having survived two previous impeachment moves by the Rivers State House of Assembly. However, another plan is afoot to impeach the ‘gentle giant’ who rode to power on the back of his predecessor, former Governor Nyesom Wike. Will he and his deputy, Prof. Ngozi Odu, survive this third attempt?

The Rivers State House of Assembly first made to impeach Fubara in October 2023. In order to thwart that move, some arsonists set a section of the Assembly on fire on Sunday, October 29, 2023. The second attempt was in March 2025 few days before President Bola Tinubu declared State of Emergency in Rivers State, in which the suspension order affected the entire members of the Rivers State House of Assembly, the Governor and the Deputy Governor. The SoE lasted from March 18 – September 18, 2025.

The second impeachment notice was communicated via a letter which was dated Friday, March 14, 2025 but was made public on Monday, March 17, 2025. The letter addressed to the Speaker, Martin Amaewhule, titled; “Notice of Allegations of Gross Misconduct Brought Pursuant to Section 188 of the Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) 1999, was signed by 26 members of the House. The letter accused the Governor of gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of the office of the Governor. A separate letter was directed to the Deputy. The letter accused the Governor of spending public funds, contrary to Sections 120, 121 and 122 of the Constitution.  A portion of the letter stated “that the Governor has shown that he is not prepared to govern Rivers State in line with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and his oath of office..”.

The third and the current impeachment move happened on Thursday, January 8, 2026. The impeachment process was initiated during plenary, presided over by Speaker Martins Amaewhule. The Majority Leader, Major Jack, read the notice of allegations against Governor Fubara, citing seven counts of gross misconduct. Allegations include the demolition of the Assembly complex, extra-budgetary expenditure, withholding of funds intended for the Assembly Service Commission, and alleged disobedience of a Supreme Court ruling on legislative financial autonomy. 26 lawmakers endorsed the notice.

Court Offered Temporary Relief to Fubara and Deputy

Interestingly, the Chief Judge of Rivers State, Simeon Amadi has declined to constitute a seven-man investigative panel, citing legal encumbrances. The Chief Judge’s position was contained in a letter dated January 20, 2026, personally signed by him and addressed to the Speaker of the House, Martin Amaewhule.   The CJ disclosed that his office received, on January 16, two separate interim injunctions issued by the Oyibo Division of the Rivers State High Court, sitting in Port Harcourt, restraining him from receiving, considering or acting on any impeachment-related request from the Assembly. According to the Chief Judge, the interim orders were granted in two separate suits filed by the Governor and his deputy: Suit No. OYHC/7/CS/2026 filed by Governor Fubara and Suit No. OYHC/6/CS/2026 filed by Prof. Odu. In both suits, the Chief Judge is listed as the 32nd Defendant.

In the letter, Justice Amadi stated that the interim injunctions expressly barred him from acting on any communication from the lawmakers relating to the constitution of a probe panel for a period of seven days, pending further proceedings. Justice Amadi further noted that the Assembly had already appealed the interim orders at the Court of Appeal, Port Harcourt Division, and that he had been served with the notices of appeal on January 19 and 20. He explained that by the doctrine of lis pendens, all parties, including the court, were required to await the outcome of the appeal.

“Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law are the bedrock of democracy, and all persons and authorities are expected to obey subsisting orders of a court of competent jurisdiction, irrespective of perception of its regularity or otherwise”, the Chief Judge stated. He stressed that until the interim orders are set aside or the suits finally determined, he remains legally constrained from exercising his constitutional duty under Section 188(5) of the Constitution. “In view of the foregoing, my hand is fettered, as there are subsisting interim orders of injunction and appeal against the said orders. I am therefore, legally disabled at this point from exercising my duties under Section 188(5) of the Constitution in the instant”, Justice Amadi concluded.

Chronicle of Impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic

Impeachment is one of the legal provisions, meant to check the excesses of the executive arm of government. Specifically, Section 188 with 11 subsections, provide a comprehensive procedure for impeaching a Governor and/or his Deputy. In this Fourth Republic which started from May 29, 1999, there have been series of successful and attempted impeachment of Governors and Deputy Governors. Successful ones are: Ayo Fayose was impeached as the Governor of Ekiti State on 16 October, 2006 on alleged mismanagement of public funds and serial killings; Peter Obi was impeached as the Governor of Anambra State on 2 November, 2006 on alleged gross misconduct; Joshua Dariye, was impeached as the Governor of Plateau State on 13 November, 2006 on alleged siphoning of public funds and money laundering in London;

Rashidi Ladoja, was impeached as the Governor of Oyo State on 12 January, 2006; Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was impeached as the Governor of Bayelsa State on 9 December, 2005 on alleged corruption which includes, theft of public funds, abuse of office, and money laundering;  Murtala Nyako was impeached as the Governor of Adamawa State in July 2014 on alleged corruption which includes theft of public funds, abuse of office and money laundering.

According to The Nation newspaper of April 9, 2024, seventeen deputy Governors have so far been impeached. They are: Femi Pedro (Lagos); Iyiola Omisore (Osun); Kofoworola Bucknor-Akerele (Lagos); Chris Ekpenyong (Akwa Ibom); Abiodun Aluko (Ekiti); Biodun Olujinmi (Ekiti); Late Garba Gadi (Bauchi); Peremobowei Elebi (Bayelsa); and Sani Abubakar Danladi (Taraba). Others are:  Jude Agbaso (Imo); Sunday Onyebuchi (Enugu); Ali Olanusi (Ondo); Eze Madumere (Imo); Simon Achuba (Kogi); Rauf Olaniyan (Oyo); Mahdi Aliyu Gusau (Zamfara) and Philip Shaibu (Edo).

Interestingly, most, if not all these impeachments have been invalidated by the courts, even though many of the victims were not able to go back to resume their offices due to effluxion of tenure expiration. The courts have serially nullified these impeachments, because due process was not followed by the initiators.

Interestingly, no President or Vice President have been successfully impeached, while some of the impeachment moves of State Governors were also unsuccessful. For instance, in September 2023, the Ondo State House of Assembly served the embattled Deputy Governor of the State, Lucky Aiyedatiwa  an impeachment notice. It was the court and the Chief Judge of the State that saved him, when he refused to constitute the 7-man panel due to a court injunction that restrained him.

The Real Issue Behind the Plot to Remove Governor Fubara and His Deputy

Though the State House of Assembly as an independent arm of government has a right to impeach the Governor and/or his Deputy; however, the reasons they advanced for their action are ostensible. They needed to call a dog a bad name, in order to hang it. The real reason behind the impeachment move, was that Fubara has reportedly become a prodigal godson of Wike. He is deemed disloyal to his godfather, who bulldozed his way to make the former Accountant General of Rivers State the Governor in 2023. Fubara’s mortal sin is believed to be, his purported attempt to hijack the political structure of his estranged godfather Wike. Governor Fubara has consistently denied this.

Recall that there was a serious attempt by Fubara to reconstitute the 23 Local Government Chairmen and Councillors of Rivers State with his own loyalists, after the end of tenure of the ones elected under Wike. This attempt was rebuffed by the RSHA. The Local Government election held in October 2024 was also nullified by the court, for allegedly failing the integrity and due process tests. It was only the one held under the sole administrator in August 2025 in which Wike’s loyalists in All Progressives Congress won 20 LGAs, and three others won under Peoples Democratic Party, that are in place now. So, Wike has now regained his political structure.

Godfather, Nyesom Wike has also openly alleged that Fubara sacked 10,000 of his supporters that he employed during his time in office, and that several of the projects he initiated have remained uncompleted by Fubara, his successor.

The plan of Wike in allegedly instigating the current impeachment move against his godson, is to do away with both the Governor and his Deputy, in order to pave way for his staunch loyalist, the Speaker of the RSHA to become acting Governor. It is important to know that, in most of the previous impeachments of the Governor, the Deputy Governor is usually left out and becomes the acting Governor. This was the case in Bayelsa, Oyo, Anambra, Adamawa and Plateau.

The other leg of the plot is to remove the Governor and Deputy Governor from office, so that they will not get to re-contest, let alone winning reelection in 2027. Wike has expressed the fear that he will be buried politically, if Fubara wins reelection. Despite the defection of the Governor and Deputy Governor from PDP to APC, Wike reportedly was unhappy that Fubara did not take him into confidence before his defection and was also boasting to be the 001 in APC, which makes him the leader of the party in Rivers State. Wike even had a public spat with the National Secretary of APC, Senator Ajibola Bashiru, when he affirmed that the Governor is the leader of APC in Rivers State.

Conclusion

It remains to be seen how the impeachment move will pan out, but, so far, Fubara seems to have a upper hand, given the obedience to court orders being observed by the Rivers State CJ. There are also several behind the scene moves, to resolve the issues politically and fashion out an out of court settlement. Most Ijaw people are also unhappy that their kinsman who happens to be the first Governor to come from the riverine area, is being coerced out of office. They are waiting in the wings, and hoping that their ‘son’ will survive this political onslaught.

Jide Ojo, Development Consultant, Author and Public Affairs Analyst