Styles of Unconstitutional Changes of Government

in Africa: The Special Case of Guinea Bissau

Bola A. Akinterinwa

The word ‘unconstitutional,’ is, on the one hand, a derivative of the prefix ‘un’, formulated in 1734 and meaning ‘not,’ and, ‘constitution,’ which is coined from a Latin word, ‘constitutus,’ meaning ‘set up,’ or ‘established.’ On the other hand, ‘constitutional’ is also a derivative of ‘constitutus’ and the suffix ‘– ion,’ meaning an act, state, or condition. Etymologically, ‘constitutional’ is about the fundamental or foundational rules or regulations governing the establishment of government and political governance, while ‘unconstitutional’ refers to ‘not established’ or ‘not in accordance with’ the established rules. In this regard, what are the established rules governing how to change government in Africa? When is a change of government unconstitutional? In which ways are the styles of change of government in Europe or America different from the styles of changing government in Africa?

Grosso modo, a change of government can take place in several ways. There is the method of evolutionary shift. There was also the time when there was no democracy and welfare states and the time they came into being. The shifting from pre-democracy states to democracy is one style in itself. Secondly, transformation events also enable a change of government. The advent of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) in the former Soviet Union prompted changes in government thereafter. The same is true of the beginning of the end of Cold War on 9 November, 1989. End of apartheid in South Africa prompted a fundamental change of government in South Africa in 1994. And also true enough is the democratisation fever introduced by French president, François Mitterrand at the La Baule Franco-African Summit in 2000. President Mitterrand subjected French development aid to democratic governance, implying that all the military dictators could not be eligible for development aid. Additionally, feudalism and monarchies have paved ways for new governments.

In contemporary times, election has been prioritised over the old methods. Even under democratic elections, there are still the methods of proportional representation and coalition-building. Thus, the shift from the feudal systems to nation-states, and then to republics and constitutional monarchies, and above all to what currently and generally exists, constitutional democracies, is what is creating concerns for the future of Africa.

Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa

By unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, we simply mean whatever transgresses, or is antithetical to the Constitution of any given country in Africa. The explication of such unconstitutional changes cannot but first require a preliminary explanation of what the constitution or the agreement or treaty provides for. In other words, there cannot be an infraction or a breach without knowing about what is breached. In this regard, we first provide an exegesis of the relevant constitutional rules and regulations at the level of the African Union and the ECOWAS.

At the level of the African Union, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) was done. The ACDEG is a binding treaty done in 2007 to promote shared democratic values among the Member States. The treaty which entered into force in 2012, places emphasis on constitutional supremacy, implying that no law or regulation shall be superior to the Constitution of the land. The conduct and management of political governance shall be consistent with the national constitution and the rule of law.

A second point of emphasis is the condemnation and unwanted unconstitutional change of government in Africa. Coups are unwanted. So are mercenary interventions. Rather than exchange of government by manu militari, regular and fair elections are preferred and promoted. Civilian control is now the fashion being generally promoted. The sermons of public accountability and transparency, as well as separation of powers, human rights and freedoms are given special priority. To underscore the seriousness of the zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) was put in place to implement whatever sanctions may be adopted against any government that comes to power illegally.

The African Union has five-in-one framework for the conduct and management of good governance, and particularly in the prevention of unconstitutional change of government. The first is the 18 July 2002 Document AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1. The document is on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’s ‘Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.’ The Declaration was a foundational document by which African leaders committed themselves to good governance, rule of law, transparency and accountability in order to promote integration, eradicate poverty and foster development in various ramifications.

In fulfilment of the commitment, a six-point action plan was also adopted. Three of the action plans that are quite relevant to the promotion of democracy are: ensuring that the respective national constitutions reflect the democratic ethos and provide for demonstrably accountability governance; promoting political representation, thus providing for all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment; and enforcing strict adherence to the position of the African Union on unconstitutional changes of government and other decisions of the continental organisation aimed at promoting democracy, good governance, peace and security.

Without doubt, the Declaration was a complement to the many earlier OAU documents on how to uphold rule of law and good governance. For examples, there are the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos (1980); the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990); the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community; the 1993 Cairo Declaration Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (adopted at the 2000 OAU Summit in Lomé; etc.

The second framework is the Constitutive Act of the African Union. In its Article 4(P), unconstitutional change of government is prohibited as a core principle and has been largely defined to include coups d’état, rebel takeovers, mercenary intervention, constitutional manipulation of elections in order to prolong stay in power or win election, refusal to transfer power after free and fair elections, etc. Apart from this, the principle also provides for sanctionary measures, such as prevention of the Government of Member States that came to power through UCG from participating in the activities of the AU.  More interestingly, the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) placed a great emphasis on the prohibition of UCG in its Article 7(g) while the 2007 Addis Ababa Charter redefined UCG to include seeking to retain power unconstitutionally.

The third framework is the AU Protocol on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, which was done on June 27, 2007 and entered into force on February 15, 2012. In the preamble of the Protocol, the AU leaders sought ‘to entrench in the Continent a political culture of change of power based on the holding of regular, free, fair and transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies. In this regard, Article 2(4) of the Protocol ‘prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development.’ In fact, Article 23 under Chapter 8 on Sanctions in Cases of Unconstitutional Change of Government clearly explains what constitutes an unconstitutional change of government.

As provided in Article 23, ‘any putsch or coup d’état against a democratically-elected government (1); any intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically-elected government; any replacement of a democratically-elected government by armed dissidents or rebels, any refusal by an incumbent to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; or any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government’ constitute an unconstitutional change of government in Africa. Put differently, any forceful attempt to oust an unelected government in power is not an unconstitutional change of government. If an elected president tries to prolong his or her stay in power, it is unconstitutional and therefore unacceptable.

The fourth framework is the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council, which enforces zero policy in regard to unconstitutional change of government through condemnations, sanctions and diplomatic interventions. Additionally, there is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’s ‘Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. In essence, all the five frameworks above are targeted at good governance, protection of human rights and rule of law, as well as evolvement of democratic culture. Under normal circumstance, there shouldn’t have been good basis for coup-making if there is any sincere compliance with the different frameworks by AU Member States.

The Case of Guinea Bissau

The coup in Guinea Bissau is quite interesting because of its controversial character. In other words, was there any coup in Guinea Bissau? Can it be rightly argued that there was a coup in Guinea Bissau? This question is germane because the AU definitional criteria of what constitutes an unconstitutional change of government are basically any forceful act to replace an elected government, even if the election had been fraudulent ab initio. Another criterion is the role of an incumbent government or president. The incumbent leader must have not manipulated the constitution or must have not lost election and be seeking to stay in power through manoeuvers. We observe here that none of the definitional criteria by the AU fits into the type of the 2025 coup in Guinea Bissau. The style of the coup appears unprecedented. Let us first provide a panoramic view of existing styles of coup-making in Africa before particularising that of Guinea Bissau.

The first style and dynamic of coup making in Africa is self-giving reasons for the coup. Coup plotters often give the same or similar excuses for their coup. They include deep-seated reasons like poor governance, corruption, economic hardship, weak or fragile democratic institutions, national interest concerns, people’s support, geo-political and anti-colonial considerations, allegations of nepotism and internal tensions within the military.

A second style is the manifestation of gun-fire, generally heard near presidential palaces, forceful arrest of the incumbent president, followed by his incarceration, and announcement by the coupists of a change of power. Borders, land and air, are often closed. Advice is often given to the people to stay calm while a curfew is imposed. In most cases, there is always a spokesperson. The ring leaders always stay quiet until formation of a new government

A third style that appears to be in vogue is what some observers have described as ‘smart coups’ existing since 2021 in West Africa and Central Africa. They are generally bloodless and organised by elite presidential guards. Without doubt, there have been cases of coups led by presidential guard commanders. However, the ousted leaders have either been eased out quietly or incarcerated or put under house arrest. The coup in Guinea Bissau is quite different in spite of its similarities.

A fourth style, which is the 2025 Bissau Guinean model is what we can describe as the ‘bojúu bojúu’ coup. Bojúu bojúu is a Yoruba expression in Nigeria meaning covering up, putting a face mask to cover up so as not to see ‘olóròo’. It is a hide-and-seek spotting game meant for relaxation of children.  ‘Olóròo’ is a main actor with traditional charms and must not be seen by passers-by. As such, on lookers are always asked to quickly cover their faces before the arrival of the ‘olóròo.’ The coup in Guinea Bissau is not in any way different. President Embaló is the main actor with the traditional charms. He is also the main onlooker. He presented himself to the international onlookers as a victim of a coup attempt, to begin with, and then as a king-maker or appointer of his successor. In other words, he has consciously induced both the ECOWAS and the AU into error, making the whole world to believe that there was truly a military coup aimed at denying him of democratic win in the general elections of Sunday, November 23, 2025.

While Nigeria’s former President, Dr Goodluck Jonathan describes the coup as a ‘ceremonial coup,’ the Senegalese Prime Minister since 2024, Ousmane Sonko, sees it as a ‘sham’ and a ‘schemed coup.’ In the eyes of a former parliamentarian and PAIGC official, Flávio Baticã Ferreira, the way President Embaló ‘left Guinea-Bissau, escorted like a tourist with his family and luggage, without any obstacle or resistance… all of this shows that it was not a coup, because we all know how a coup works.’ All these observations are valid but not to the extent that there was no coup. A coup is any change of government by manu militari.

Additionally, in the words of Beverly Ochieng at the Control Risks, the coup ‘was carried out by people who are Embaló’s close allies in the military. Dinis N’Tchama, one of the generals who led the coup, was a personal military advisor of the President.’ Put differently, the opposition and the general public believe that the coup was staged because Embaló was losing his grip on power.

Above all, President Embaló, in his telephone to the AFP, said that ‘all is well,’ that is, ‘the situation is under control,’ and that ‘it wasn’t just a coup. It was an attempt to kill the President, the Prime Minister and all the cabinet,’ More importantly, he said the army was not involved in the coup. As he put it, ‘’I can assure you that no camp joined this attempted coup. It was isolated. It is linked to people we have successfully repelled.

In essence therefore, if the Bissau Guinean army was not involved in the 2025 coup, and the coupists came to power in order to prevent the destabilisation of the country by foreign elements, how do we explain the destruction of election results? Why the destruction? One possible truth is that the Bissau Guinean coup has a Bojúu bojúu character. It is probably because of this factor of Bojúu bojúu that the AU has not been able to contain unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.

Put differently, the AU’s conscious neglect of poor governance under an elected President, and particularly the impact of the poor governance on the people cannot but be a major dynamic of recidivist coups in Africa. The AU has not always been able to prevent bad governance or hold any of its Member State accountable to the people. This is in spite of the fact of existence of African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) put in place in 2003 by the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) as a voluntary AU system for politico-economic, corporate, and socio-industrial self-assessment.

What is noteworthy about the APRM is that, first, Members not only join willingly but also prepare a Self-Assessment Report covering only four thematic areas: democracy and political governance; Economic governance and Management; Corporate Governance, and socio-economic development.

Secondly, and procedurally, a Country Review Team, which is an independent team, is put in place to conduct consultations and reviews after which a draft report is shared with the Government for input and to create a National Action Plan. Thirdly, the final report is presented to the APRM Forum of Heads of State for possible adoption. If the report is adopted, it will be publicly circulated to promote accountability and learning. Beyond this, no elected President is on record to have been brought to book for poor governance. The mere fact that the membership of the APRM is voluntary does not show collective seriousness of purpose. The APRM is evolving to be more effective, with 44 members as of 2024. However, the evolvement has not been to the extent of being able to prevent coups-making in Africa.

On 14 November 1980, Guinea Bissau played host to its first coup d’état. The coup will be 45 years old next week Sunday, 14 November 2025. Most unfortunately, however, after 45 years of political governance, lessons have not been learnt from the first attempted coup

d^’ état.  The 1980 coup took place with minimum disruption.President Lius Cabral was

removed from office  and Prime Minister ,General João Bernando Vieira took over power. Since 1980, there have been more than ten coups, either attempted, failed, or successful, but there has been only one elected president that has completed a full term in office. President Embaló is the only president that has had a successful completion of his presidential tenure and he still wants to be placed on record to be the first to be re-elected. Most unfortunately again, he adopted several policies that made his re-election impossible. The policies also explain why he organised his Bojúu bojúu coup. Without doubt, it is a Bojúu bojúu because majority of the 28-member government, put in place by the President of the Transitional Republic, Gen. Horta Inta-a, are allies of the self-ousted president. The implication of this is that the Embaló administration simply did not want the opposition to accede to power. If it was truly a coup against Embaló and his men, there cannot be any good reason to seek the reappointment of his allies in government. More important, President Embaló is a democratico-dictator because, under the pretext of a failed coup in 2023, he suspended the parliament, which is opposition-dominated and has been ruling since 2023 by decrees. Again, before the 2025 election, President Embaló was faced with a legitimacy crisis as the opposition had accused him of governing beyond his tenure which came to an end in February 2025. Unlike several coups in Africa whose declared objectives are to better protect the country against insurgencies or fixing bad governance, the November 26 coup is a self-made coup to simply cover up election defeat, which we have called bojú bojú coup or hide-and-seek politics.