TAKEAWAYS FROM NEW ELECTORAL ACT 

The Electoral Act will influence positively how the country is governed, writes OPEYEMI BAMIDELE

The Electoral Act, 2026 has finally come into force. Its enactment confirms the demise of the old order that never perfectly met our aspirations and proclaims the birth of an entirely new order that now promises the future we all desire. The National Assembly enacted the Act purely in the collective interest of the citizenry to deepen credibility; promote transparency and boost the integrity of our electoral process. Unlike before, the process, which culminated in its passage alone, took the parliament two years of rigorous work and broader engagement.

But why did the process take us such a long time? First, the process was inclusive and not unilateral. It was painstakingly midwifed to broadly engage key stakeholders – civil society organisations (CSOs) development partners, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation (OAGF). Second, it entailed building confidence across all the strata of our fatherland so that the parliament would not work at cross purposes with the stakeholders.

At the end of it all, the two-year process delivered us an entirely new electoral governance framework that will henceforth regulate how we manage our political parties; how we choose our political leaders and how we govern our nation in line with democratic tenets that reinforce the public confidence. The process did not scale through easily. Clause 60(3) of the Electoral Bill, which deals with how election results are transmitted from the polling units, sharply triggered divergence among lawmakers in both chambers.

But the clause was subjected to clause-by-clause voting, a globally recognised mechanism for dispute resolution among democratic legislatures. In the Senate, at least 70 lawmakers took part in the consideration of the clause. Of this figure, no fewer than 55 senators approved the adoption of electronic transmission of election results with a proviso while 15 disapproved it. This represents a 78.57 % approval, and its outcome is consistent with core tenets and values that govern democracies globally. Does this suggest the parliament disapproved the clause? We did not reject it, but I will address what we did later in this piece.

Specifically, for me, the way we managed the process; the way we addressed dissenting voices and the way we mainstreamed inclusiveness into the whole process are a testament to the resilience of our democracy. How is it a testament? It will be clearer before I round off this piece. What then can we learn from the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2026? Or what does the new regime portend for the country’s political environment? The new regime, honestly, is a major shift from our previous electoral governance frameworks. This is evident in the preponderance of key reforms embedded in the new regime.

At least, there are 12 compelling takeaways about the Act that no stakeholder can deny or downplay. The first is the creation of a dedicated fund for the INEC under Section 3. The logic behind the Fund is pure and simple: it aims at enhancing financial autonomy, operational stability and administrative efficiency of the electoral institution. Also, this provision perfectly aligns with Section 153(1) and Third Schedule, Item F, paragraph 14 of the 1999 Constitution that authorise the INEC to exercise its powers independently and without undue interference from any quarters. Unlike the 2022 Electoral Act, the new regime stipulates that the election funds “due to the INEC for any general election shall be released not later than 6 months before the next general election…” It is now obligatory and no more optional as it was under the old regime.

The second is explicit in Section 47(2) of the Electoral Act, 2026. The section provides for the compulsory use of Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) or any other technological device mandatory “to verify, confirm or authenticate the particulars of the intending voter in the manner prescribed by the INEC”. Wherever such a device fails to function and a fresh one is not deployed, Section 47(3) stipulates that the election of the polling units “shall be cancelled and another election shall be scheduled within 24 hours if the INEC is satisfied that the result of the election in that polling unit will substantially affect the final result…”

The third decisively addresses the issue that often arises from the mingling of female and male voters on the queue. In some parts of the federation, culture frowns at such a practice. This factor has been one of the explanations for the low voter turnout in some states because of the belief they hold or the culture they practise. But Section 49 now authorises the presiding officers “to separate the queue of male voters from that of female counterparts” in areas where culture is dominant. Its essence is two folds. First, it is in observance of the belief or culture that does not permit the mingling of female and male voters on the same. Second, it is a measure aimed at boosting broader participation in our electoral process.

Another takeaway relates to a mechanism introduced to deepen inclusiveness in our country’s electoral process. This mechanism is designed to support voters with visual impairment or other forms of disability. Under Section 54(1), the new regime authorises the presiding officers to provide an environment that can support voters with such conditions to exercise their suffrage without let or hindrance. But the section further stipulates that no political party agent, candidate or party official “shall be permitted to accompany a voter into the voting compartment.”

Under Section 54(2), the Act equally seeks to protect the rights of vulnerable voters. The section directs the INEC to “take reasonable steps to ensure that persons with disabilities, special needs and vulnerable persons are assisted at the polling place by the provision of suitable means of communication, such as Braille, large embossed print, electronic devices, sign language interpretation, or off-site voting in appropriate cases.” This provision further deepens inclusion into our country’s electoral governance framework and ends the vicious cycle of exclusion that prevailed in our political environment long before now.

The fifth resolves how election results should be transmitted after the conclusion of voting. This triggered a protracted debate that lasted four weeks. But consensus was eventually reached in favour of Section 60(3) of the Electoral Act. The section now guarantees the mandatory electronic transmission to the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) from the polling units. It is consistent with the public demand that electronic transmission should be compulsory. But the Act looks beyond mere electronic transmission. It factors in an unforeseen situation that may cost dearly if not properly addressed. It foresees communication failure, which may occur before or during the voting process. We can create a mechanism that will help us legally resolve issues that may arise. In this instance, the presiding officers may fall back on Form EC8A for the purpose of result collation.

Section 60(6) deals with a measure that can prevent the presiding officers from contravening or frustrating the electronic transmission of election results. Its significance is to prevent any form of sabotage and sanction it. On this ground, the Act prescribes a six-month imprisonment or a fine of N500,000 or both against presiding officers that frustrates the transmission of election results as required under the new legislation. This means the presiding officers will now be held accountable for the failure to electronically transmit election results, especially when there is no justifiable reason to do otherwise.

Sixth, under Section 72(2), the Act spells requirements for the inauguration of any candidate that the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court pronounced winner after the determination of any election petition. The section stipulates that a certified true copy of the court order “shall be sufficient for the swearing-in of any candidate declared as the winner of an election by the court.” In this instance, the new regime clarifies that the certified true copy of court order can only be used for such purpose if the INEC fails, refuses, or neglects to issue the certificate of return. This is a shift from the previous practice that encouraged logjam or delay in the enforcement of the court order.

The seventh borders on the access to election documents that may be requested for by any political party, its candidates or any other interest. Under Section 74(1-2), the new legislation authorises the Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) to release the certified true copy of such documents to any interest or political party that requested them within 14 days after the payment of a prescribed fee. But if the REC fails to comply with this provision, Subsection 2 stipulates that the REC has already committed “an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a minimum term of two years without an option of fine.”

Eighth, Section 77 (1-5) of the 2026 Electoral Act provides for stringent measures that will henceforth govern and regulate the conduct of primaries and the process of organising party primaries, congresses or conventions from the ward to the national level. As a result, this section places each political party under the obligation to maintain a digital register of its members; issue membership cards to each of them and submit such a register to the INEC 21 days before the party primaries, congresses or conventions.

This provision seeks to effectively regulate how political parties manage their internal affairs and how they elect their candidates. Under Section 77 (6-7), the new regime states that a political party “shall not use any other register for party primaries, congresses and conventions than the register submitted to the INEC. A political party that fails to submit the membership register within the stipulated time shall not be eligible to field a candidate for that election.” These measures are indeed consequential restraint measures, which most stakeholders strongly believe, will deepen internal democracy and de-monetise our electoral and political system.

The ninth revolves around the models of electing candidates for elective offices. Section 84(2) spells out the models – direct primaries and consensus. Unlike the 2022 Electoral Act, the indirect model had been deleted from this provision on two different grounds. First, it is designed to reduce the use of money to compromise party delegates. Second, it aims at embracing a model that will bequeath the power of electing party flag bearers on the party membership rather than some delegates that constitutes a minute fraction of party members.

Another takeaway is evident in the upward review of the campaign spending limit under Section 92(1-8) of the 2026 Electoral Act. The presidential campaign spending limit has been reviewed upward from ₦5 billion to ₦10 billion. The spending limit for governorship campaign has been raised from ₦1 billion to ₦3 billion; senatorial campaign now from ₦100 million to ₦500 million;  House of Representatives from ₦70 million to ₦250 million; House of Assembly from ₦30 million to ₦100 million; Area Council from ₦30 million to ₦60 million and the limit for councillorship campaign has been raised from ₦5 million to ₦10 million. This review, to a large extent, now reflects the country’s current socio-economic realities.

Eleventh, under Section 93 (3-4), the new legislation introduced an accountability mechanism aimed at demonetising the country’s political activities and prescribing commensurate sanctions where breaches are established. The section mandates each political party to submit an audited return of its election expenses to the INEC within six months after the election. It also requires that the audited return “shall be signed by the political party’s auditors and countersigned by the Chairman of the party …” As a measure to enforce compliance, Section 93 (7) prescribes a fine of ₦10 million against a political party that failed to submit an accurate audited return within the stipulated period.

Lastly, the new regime enshrined different measures with a view to checking the ugly trends of vote buying, impersonation and result manipulation during the general election. Under 125(1-2), the new regime stipulates a two-year imprisonment for such offences. But such cases must be tried, prosecuted and established before the award of penalties. It equally sets out fines ranging between ₦500,000 and ₦2 million or both when the court establishes prima facie cases against the suspects of such offences. These measures are introduced to discourage both buyers and sellers of votes from such unethical practices that not only compromise the integrity of our electoral process, but also aid the election of rogue candidates to grab political powers through the back door.

From all indications, the Electoral Act, 2026 is a product of collective responsibility, involving nearly all interests across the federation. Each of these takeaways attests to far-reaching reforms that have been mainstreamed into our new electoral governance framework. This thus leads us to two deductions to sum up this intervention. The amendment is not limited to Section 60(3), which prescribes how we transmit our election results. It also embraces a lot of initiatives that will positively improve how we choose our leaders, how we manage our political parties and how we govern our fatherland purely in the spirit of democracy.

Senator Bamidele, CON, is the

Leader of the Nigerian Senate